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Abstract 
While numerous scholars have examined the relationship between individuals’ Christian 
religiosity and their support for the death penalty, empirical tests of this relationship show mixed 
results.  In this paper, I argue that past empirical inconsistencies may be due to measurement 
error in the religious variables and dependent variable.  Using the Fourth National Survey of 
Religion and Politics, I test the effects of individuals’ religious belonging, beliefs, and behaviors 
on their preference for replacing the death penalty with a sentence of life without parole.  I find 
that Roman Catholic affiliation, Biblical literalism, and more frequent practice of religious 
behaviors affect support for LWOP vs. the death penalty, although the effect of Catholic 
affiliation differs across levels of religious behavior and political ideology. 
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Introduction 
 Religion has always been a part of the debate about the death penalty in America.  Some 
of the earliest abolitionists viewed the crusade to eliminate capital punishment as a Christian 
imperative, while many of their pro-death penalty opponents cited the Bible to argue that capital 
punishment was an acceptable exercise of state power under God’s law (Davis, 1957).  The 
debate remains unresolved today.  Numerous Christian denominations in America take positions 
on both sides of the issue at the aggregate level (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life), while 
scholars have observed individual citizens citing religion to justify their pro- or anti-death 
penalty attitudes (Cook & Powell, 2003; Vandiver, Giacopassi, & Gathje, 2001).  Thus, 
historical and empirical evidence indicates that religion impacts citizens’ support for or 
opposition to capital punishment. 
 Although scholars have begun empirical efforts to understand the exact nature of the 
relationship between individuals’ religiosity and their attitudes toward the death penalty, results 
to date are mixed.  Some studies demonstrate positive relationships between various measures of 
religion and support for the death penalty (e.g., Grasmick, Cochran, Bursik, & Kimpel 1993; 
Unnever, Cullen, & Bartkowski 2006), while other studies find that the same variables generate 
no statistically significant relationships (e.g., Applegate, Cullen, Fisher, & Vander Ven 2000; 
Soss, Langbein, & Metelko 2003).  Furthermore, scholars are largely hampered by data 
limitations that preclude the ability to include religion in studies that address the known 
sensitivity of individuals’ answers regarding the death penalty to factors such as question 
wording and variety of response options (Jones, 1994; McGarrell & Sandys, 1996).  Though we 
have learned much about the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward the death 
penalty, more work is needed to fully understand the complexities of this relationship. 
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 In this paper, I use a new dataset to explore the impact of individuals’ religiosity on their 
preference for the death penalty versus a sentence of life in prison without parole, a more 
nuanced question that has been shown to notably affect the preference distribution of 
respondents’ answers (Bohm, Flanagan, & Harris, 1989).  First, I discuss Christian scripture and 
dogma and argue that the Bible provides theoretical support for both punitive and lenient 
attitudes.  Second, I identify empirical inconsistencies in the extant literature on religiosity and 
attitudes toward punishment and posit that these inconsistencies may be due to measurement 
problems in the religious variables and death penalty dependent variable.  Third, I present the 
results of an ordered logit analysis in which I find that Roman Catholic affiliation and 
engagement in religious behaviors affect support for replacing the death penalty with LWOP.  
Finally, I discuss my findings and propose avenues for future research. 
The Bible, Dogma, and Christian Theory 
 The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life cites nine different major American Christian 
denominations and religious organizations that have adopted official policy stances in regard to 
the death penalty.  The American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. the Episcopal Church, the 
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A), the United Methodist Church, the U.S. Conference of Catholic 
Bishops, and the National Council of Churches oppose capital punishment, while the Lutheran 
Church-Missouri Synod, the Southern Baptist Convention, and the National Evangelical 
Association support the death penalty. 
 To the casual observer, it might seem strange that denominations that follow the same 
scripture can reach diametrically opposed positions about the death penalty.  However, scholars 
point out that the Bible contains support for both punitive and lenient attitudes.  By examining 
scripture and the tradition of Christian philosophers, Murphy (2003) discusses the theoretical 
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arguments under which strict punishment, notably the death penalty, is admissible under Judeo-
Christian law.  He cautions that one should not confuse the Christian mandate to love one’s 
neighbor as being equivalent to soft sentimentality.  Consider Biblical passages such as,  
He who sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed… 
          (Genesis 9:6) 
 
If further harm is done, however, you will award life for life, eye for eye, 
tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for 
wound, stroke for stroke…               (Exodus 21:23-25) 
 
So anyone who disobeys an authority is rebelling against God’s ordinance; 
and rebels must expect to receive the condemnation they deserve….  [I]t is 
not for nothing that the symbol of authority is the sword: it is there to 
serve God, too, as his avenger, to bring retribution to wrongdoers…  
                       (Romans 13:2, 4)   
 
each of which indicate that retributive punishment, even death, can be administered by the state 
as an agent of God’s will.  Murphy posits, therefore, that the key to understanding Christian 
beliefs about punishment is to understand that forgiveness is a matter of the heart, a change in 
feelings towards the offender, not necessarily an action.  Taken in consideration with the primary 
Christian concern of salvation not in this world, but in heaven, Murphy argues that it is possible 
to forgive an offender and still require that the offender be punished, even by death, so long as 
efforts have been made to save the offender’s soul.   
Other scholars, however, call attention to the dominant emphasis on love and forgiveness 
in Christian thought and argue that interpretations of scripture that allow any form of retributive 
or vindictive punishment miss the spirit of the law (Boulton, 2007).  Beckman (2004), for 
example, critiques Murphy’s (2003) analysis and highlights the fine distinction between word 
and deed.  She cites the famous story of Jesus and the woman caught in adultery (John 8:3-11).  
When the crowd wanted to stone her, Jesus says, “Let the one among you who is guiltless be the 
first to throw a stone at her” (John 8:7).  When the crowd disperses and the woman marvels that 
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no one has condemned her, Jesus states, “Neither do I condemn you…. Go away, and from this 
moment sin no more” (John 8:11).  The crowd would have been fully within their rights to stone 
the woman according to the Hebrew law, yet Jesus not only forgave her, he commuted the 
punishment itself because no human is in a sufficient state of grace to pass such judgment upon 
another person.   
Even this brief consideration of scripture and philosophy reveals that Christians have 
theoretical, dogmatic reasons to either support the punishments that currently exist in America’s 
criminal justice system or argue for their abolition or reformation in favor of more 
compassionate forms of legal accountability for criminal acts.  Whether Christians’ religious 
beliefs actually lead them to greater punitiveness or leniency towards offenders is an empirical 
question, however, and scholars have begun to examine the relationship between Christian 
beliefs and attitudes towards punishment.  The results that have emerged out of this growing 
body of literature are mixed and leave many questions unanswered. 
Empirical Inconsistencies and Challenges 
Inconsistent Results 
 Scholars in this line of inquiry have employed a number of different variables in order to 
measure religious beliefs and test their effects on attitudes toward punishment.  These variables 
include Christian fundamentalism, Biblical literalism, religious salience, image of God, 
forgiveness, and compassion.  Stemming both from the nature of fundamentalist beliefs and the 
fact that fundamentalists have become increasingly involved in social politics in the past quarter 
century (Guth, Green, Kellstedt, & Smidt, 1996; Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2007), Christian 
fundamentalism is the most frequently employed independent variable.  However, measures of 
fundamentalism have performed inconsistently in regard to dependent measures of punitiveness.  
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While some studies find relationships that link fundamentalism to variables of increased 
punitiveness (consistent with “eye for an eye” theory), such as support for the death penalty 
(Britt, 1998; Grasmick et al., 1993; Unnever et al., 2006; Young, 1992), support for harsher 
courts (Grasmick et al., 1993), retributive ideology (Evans & Adams, 2003; Grasmick, 
Davenport, Chamlin, & Bursik, 1992), and a perception that crimes are sinful and deserve to be 
punished (Curry, 1996), other studies find that fundamentalism predicts decreased support for 
punitive variables, such as support for harsher sentencing by courts (Unnever, Cullen, & 
Applegate, 2005).   
Other scholars find that the effects of fundamentalism were contingent upon interactions 
with other factors.  Borg (1997) finds that the effect of fundamentalism on support for the death 
penalty varies widely depending upon one’s regional identity; southern fundamentalists are more 
likely to support the death penalty, while non-southern fundamentalists are less likely.  Similarly, 
other scholars find that fundamentalism decreases support for the death penalty among blacks 
but is either insignificant (Young & Thompson, 1995) or increases support (Unnever & Cullen, 
2007a) among whites.  Unnever and Cullen (2006) find a comparatively weak relationship in that 
fundamentalists are no more likely to support the death penalty than members of more moderate 
or liberal Christian denominations.  In contrast, other scholars have failed to find any significant 
relationship between fundamentalism and support for the death penalty (Applegate et al., 2000; 
Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld, 2003; Sandys & McGarrell, 1997; Soss et al., 2003; Unnever & 
Cullen, 2006) or for harsher local courts (Applegate et al., 2000). 
Scholars have employed several other variables to measure different facets of Christian 
beliefs, but most demonstrate the same inconsistency as fundamentalism.  Literal interpretation 
of the Bible and a harsh, judgmental image of God typically generate a positive relationship with 
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measures of punitiveness (Bader & Johnson, 2007; Evans & Adams, 2003; Grasmick et al., 
1992; Grasmick et al., 1993; Unnever, Cullen, & Fisher, 2005; Unnever & Cullen, 2006), but just 
as frequently these variables yield inconsistent results between models and types of punishments 
(Bader & Johnson, 2007; Grasmick et al., 1993; Grasmick & McGill, 1994; Young, 1992; Young 
& Thompson, 1995) or fail to achieve statistical significance (Applegate et al., 2000; Britt, 1998; 
Unnever & Cullen, 2006; Unnever et al., 2006).   
Similarly, the degree to which religion is important in one’s life (i.e., religious salience) 
and the importance one places on compassion and forgiveness are frequently negatively related 
to measures of punitiveness (Applegate et al., 2000; Britt, 1998; Grasmick et al., 1992; Unnever 
et al., 2005a; Unnever & Cullen, 2006), but they too generate inconsistent results (Applegate et 
al., 2000; Grasmick & McGill, 1994) or fail to reach significance (Evans & Adams, 2003; Moon, 
Wright, Cullen, & Pealer, 2000; Sandys & McGarrell, 1997; Unnever et al., 2006).  In sum, these 
inconsistencies in the extant literature indicate that more research is needed in order to further 
clarify the nature of the relationship between Christian religiosity and attitudes toward 
punishment. 
Two bodies of work may help elucidate why the study of religion and punishment 
opinions suffers from these empirical limitations.  The first body of work concerns the 
measurement of the various dimensions of religiosity.  The second body of work concerns the 
effects of the questions themselves on the nature of respondents’ answers to questions about the 
death penalty. 
Toward More Precise Measurement of Religion 
 To date, criminologists have overwhelmingly relied upon Tom Smith’s (1990) 
fundamentalist/moderate/liberal classification scheme that is contained in the General Social 
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Survey’s “fund” variable as their operational definition of religious affiliation (Grasmick et al. 
1992; Young & Thompson 1995; Sandys & McGarrell 1997; Britt 1998; Borg 1998; Unnever et 
al. 2005a, 2005b; Unnever & Cullen 2006; Unnever et al. 2006).  While this measure is very 
frequently used by social scientists, numerous scholars argue that it is a poor measure for various 
reasons.  First, the measure is ahistorical (Smidt, Kellstedt, & Guth, forthcoming).  It implies that 
most religious denominations in America would choose the terms fundamentalist, moderate, or 
liberal as core descriptors.  This is not the case.  Most notably, Smith’s scheme implies that most 
denominations on the “conservative” end of the spectrum are fundamentalist when, in fact, 
fundamentalism is a comparatively small subset of evangelicalism/conservative Protestantism, a 
much broader religious tradition (Kellstedt & Smidt, 1996; Steensland, Park, Regnerus, 
Robinson, Wilcox, & Woodberry, 2000; Woodberry & Smith, 1998).  Second, the construction 
of Smith’s scheme implies an ordinal ranking between denominations when a nominal 
categorization is more appropriate (Steensland et al., 2000).  Third, the use of the terms 
“moderate” and “liberal” conflates the spectrum of religious traditions with the continuum of 
political ideology; though a correlation does exist between the two constructs, it is far from 
absolute (Kellstedt, Green, Guth, & Smidt, 1996).  Finally, Smith categorizes Catholics as 
moderates and black Protestants as fundamentalists, a coding scheme that obscures both the 
diversity within these religious traditions and their very real theological and cultural distinctions 
from dominantly white Protestant denominations (Lincoln & Mamiya, 1990; Smidt et al., 
forthcoming).  
 It is possible that the limitations of the “fund” coding scheme may partially explain the 
inconsistent results found in this body of literature, most notably the fluctuations of the 
fundamentalism variable from study to study.  Due to the fact that the oft-used fundamentalism 
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variable is a questionable match to the distinctions between various Christian religious families 
in America, it generates theoretically ambiguous results.  In order to overcome the weaknesses of 
Smith’s coding scheme, I employ the measurement strategy of Kellstedt, Smidt, and Guth 
(Kellstedt et al., 1996; Smidt et al., forthcoming).  These scholars recommend a tripartite 
measurement scheme that they call “the three B’s” – belonging (i.e. denominational affiliation), 
beliefs, and behavior.  This scheme captures various facets of a respondent’s religiosity, from her 
beliefs in the metaphysical to her frequency of acts of devotion, like prayer and church 
attendance.  By including a variable for each dimension of a person’s religiosity in a regression 
model, I am able to operationally measure the effect of each facet of religiosity on a person’s 
attitudes toward punishment.  Criminologists already recognize the dimensions of religiosity and 
intuitively echoed the “three B’s” measurement scheme by employing measures of Biblical 
literalism (belief), church attendance, and prayer frequency (behavior) in this line of inquiry.  
This coding scheme simply employs more robust measures of these core constructs. 
Question Wording, Response Options, and Death Penalty Opinion 
 The second body of literature that may help explain the inconsistencies in the study of 
religion and support for the death penalty is well known to criminologists.  A number of scholars 
have demonstrated that the results one is likely to get from a survey of death penalty opinion are 
heavily influenced by the nature of the questions themselves.  Numerous studies with various 
samples that employ the standard, favor-vs.-oppose death penalty question find that a majority of 
Americans support capital punishment (Cullen, Pealer, Fisher, Applegate, & Santana, 2002; Pew 
Research Center, 2007; Unnever & Cullen, 2006).  Furthermore, this high level of support has 
been stable for decades. 
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 However, studies that employ modifications to the standard, favor-vs.-oppose question 
often find quite different results.  Jones (1994) utilized three different versions of the death 
penalty support question that manipulated the “don’t know” response option so that it was either 
absent, provided by the interviewer, or integrated into the question as a preliminary filter (i.e., 
“Do you have an opinion about the death penalty?”).  Moving from the absent to provided to 
filter conditions, Jones found that the percentages of respondents favoring and opposing the 
death penalty dropped, while the percentage who answered “don’t know” increased dramatically. 
 Harris (1986) asked his respondents to clarify whether they supported the death penalty 
in all murder cases, in certain circumstances, or never.  He found that a majority of respondents 
supported the death penalty only in certain circumstances; under a third of respondents supported 
the death penalty unequivocally.  Finally, various scholars demonstrate that respondents’ mean 
level of support for the death penalty notably drops when they are offered the alternative 
punishments of life in prison without parole (LWOP) or LWOP plus work and restitution to the 
victim’s family (Bohm, 1991; Bohm et al., 1989; Bowers, 1993; McGarrell & Sandys, 1996; 
Sandys & McGarrell, 1995).  These studies not only suggest that individuals’ support for capital 
punishment is likely to waver if they are offered a meaningful alternative punishment for 
offenders, the results also show researchers that their empirical results of public opinion about 
the death penalty are as much a product of the questions employed as they are the product of 
citizens’ actual beliefs. 
 To date, virtually all the studies that examine the impact of religiosity on support for the 
death penalty use the standard, favor-vs.-oppose version of the question.  The one exception is 
Bader and Johnson (2007) who asked their respondents how strongly they favor abolishment of 
the death penalty by the federal government.  While this question does capture policy 
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preferences more concretely than standard death penalty questions, it still lacks the precision of 
more nuanced questions that ask respondents to choose the death penalty versus other 
punishment alternatives.  The current study addresses this gap in the literature. 
The Current Study 
 I analyze data from the Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, cosponsored by 
the University of Akron Survey Research Center and the Pew Forum on Religion and Public 
Life.1  This instrument is unique amongst nationally-representative surveys in two ways.  First, it 
asks a full battery of questions about the respondent’s religiosity, which allows me to construct a 
series of robust religious variables.  Second, the survey asks the respondent to describe her 
preference for a sentence of life without parole in contrast to the death penalty, a more nuanced 
measure of death penalty preference that moves beyond the simple favor-oppose dichotomy.  
Thus, this is the first study to examine the effects of individuals’ religiosity on their support for 
the death penalty versus an alternate punishment. 
 Although past research demonstrates that no variable in this line of inquiry exerts 
unidirectional effects in all circumstances, both theory and the results of a plurality of studies 
suggest that certain variables will have either a positive or negative relationship with support for 
punitive punishments.  My measurement scheme is not an exact match to the variables in past 
work, but I expect many of my measures to exert effects comparable to other variables in the 
literature.  For example, my measure of frequency of religious behaviors captures church 
attendance and is theoretically comparable to religious salience in that both measure the strength 
of one’s engagement with one’s religion.  Thus, I expect to replicate the general trends of the 
literature in my study.  In regard to the key explanatory variables,  
                                                 
1
 I thank John Green, James Guth, Lyman Kellstedt, and Corwin Smidt for the generous use of this data. 
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Hypothesis 1: Members of Roman Catholic, mainline Protestant, and black Protestant 
denominations as well as individuals with a higher frequency of religious 
practices will be more likely to agree that the death penalty should be replaced 
with life without parole than members of evangelical denominations as well as 
individuals with more traditional religious beliefs, biblical literalists, and 
individuals who believe that their denomination should adhere to traditional 
beliefs and practices. 
Method 
Data 
 The Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics is a national random sample of adult 
Americans conducted in 2004 with a total sample size of 4,000 cases (see Green, 2004; Guth, 
Kellstedt, Smidt, & Green, 2006).  The data is weighted to be representative of the adult 
population of the United States.  I report the descriptive statistics and theoretically predicted sign 
of all variables in the appendix. 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable in this study is preference for LWOP vs. the death penalty.  This 
variable is measured by responses to the statement, “The death penalty for convicted murderers 
should be replaced with life in prison without parole.”  The response options to this item are 
strongly agree, agree, no opinion, disagree, and strongly disagree.  I reverse coded the item so 
that higher scores indicate agreement that LWOP should replace the death penalty.  Additionally, 
I also collapsed strongly agree with agree and disagree with strongly disagree in order to make a 
3-point variable with response categories of disagree, no opinion, and agree; I made this choice 
for methodological reasons that I detail in the analysis section of this paper. 
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Independent Variables 
 The first series of independent variables measure respondents’ religious belonging (i.e., 
their affiliation with a particular Christian denomination).  These variables are premised upon the 
idea that a group of religious communities share a set of beliefs that generate a distinctive 
worldview; it is this tradition-specific worldview that theoretically generates the effect of 
denominational affiliation on individual outcomes (Kellstedt et al., 1996).  Numerous scholars 
recognize four core Christian religious traditions in America - Roman Catholics, mainline 
Protestants, evangelical Protestants, and black Protestants2 (Dougherty, Johnson, & Polson, 
2007; Kellstedt et al., 1996; Steensland et al., 2000).  Respondents were asked to identify the 
denomination in which they are a member, and I coded these denominations into one of the four 
religious tradition dummy variables.  I base my categorization of the denominations into 
religious traditions using the categorization of Steensland et al. (2000).   
For the denominations contained within the National Survey of Religion and Politics that 
were not contained within the dataset of Steensland et al. (2000), I followed the 
recommendations of Kellstedt et al. (1996) and Smidt et al. (forthcoming) who argue that 
evangelical Protestant denominations can be distinguished from mainline Protestant 
denominations by evangelicals’ dogmatic emphasis on the inerrancy of Scripture, a belief in 
Jesus as the only way to salvation, an emphasis on a conversion experience, and an emphasis on 
evangelism.  Gathering information about the unclassified denominations from their websites or 
religious encyclopedias (Mead & Hill, 2005; Melton, 2005), I categorized the remaining 
                                                 
2
 “Black Protestant” measures affiliation with one of six historically-black Protestant denominations in America (see 
appendix). I do not code black individuals who are members of historically-white evangelical or mainline 
denominations as “black Protestants” because I want to separate the individual effects of one’s denominational 
affiliation (i.e., the influence of the denomination’s worldview on one’s attitudes) from the effects of one’s race.  
See Lincoln and Mamiya (1990) for a discussion of the theological and cultural differences between historically-
black and dominantly-white denominations. 
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Protestant denominations as either evangelical or mainline.  I provide the list of denominations 
grouped by religious tradition in the appendix. 
In addition, a robust measure of denominational affiliation must account for the growing 
number of nondenominational evangelical Protestants in America (Smidt et al., forthcoming; 
Steensland et al., 2000).  These are individuals who attend nondenominational (primarily 
evangelical) congregations.  Though they will probably not provide an answer to a denomination 
question, their religious beliefs and level of practice are likely as robust as any respondent who 
provides an affiliation.  It is also important to distinguish these “religiously unaffiliated” 
individuals from atheists, agnostics, and other individuals who do not actively practice a faith 
because members of each group demonstrate different political behaviors (Smidt et al., 
forthcoming).  I classified all individuals who provided ambiguous denomination answers (i.e., 
“just a Protestant”) as evangelicals if they also responded that “belief in Jesus Christ is the only 
way to salvation” and that the Bible is “true, to be taken word for word” in response to separate 
belief questions; I classified ambiguous individuals as mainline Protestant if they responded that 
“belief in Jesus Christ is ONE way to salvation, but there are other ways as well.”3  I mark 
denominations to which I applied this secondary classification scheme in the appendix. 
The second independent variable measures respondents’ religious beliefs.  This variable 
is a scale that is comprised of the responses to six questions that measure respondents’ certainty 
in the existence of God, an afterlife, and the devil, their view of God as a personal creator or 
impersonal force, their view of the Bible as inspired by God or a book of myths, and their level 
                                                 
3
 Smidt et al. (forthcoming) are clearer about the defining characteristics of evangelicalism than they are of mainline 
Protestantism.  Though I tried adding a non-literalist view of the Bible as a distinguishing characteristic of 
mainliners, the resultant estimate of the proportion of mainliners in the sample did not provide a good match with 
the estimated proportion of mainliners in comparable work (Kellstedt et al., 1996). 
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of agreement with the statement that evolution is the best explanation of life on earth.4  I used 
principle components factor analysis to construct the scale so that higher values indicate more 
traditional religious beliefs (i.e., God as a personal creator, Bible as divinely inspired, certain the 
devil exists, etc.).5   
 The third independent variable measures the extent of respondents’ religious behaviors.  
As with the religious beliefs scale, this variable is a scale that is comprised of the responses to 
six questions that measure the frequency of respondents’ church attendance, Bible reading, 
prayer outside of worship service, and participation in small religious groups, as well a measure 
of the percent of the respondents’ income that she tithes to her congregation or other religious 
organizations.  Again, I used factor analysis to construct the scale so that higher values indicate 
more extensive participation in religious behaviors.6  The two scale variables are standardized 
with means of about 0 and standard deviations of about 1. 
 Numerous studies of religiosity and attitudes toward punishment specifically highlight 
the effect of interpreting the Bible literally (Applegate et al., 2000; Britt, 1998; Grasmick et al., 
1992; Grasmick & McGill, 1994; Sandys & McGarrell, 1997; Unnever et al., 2005b; Unnever & 
Cullen, 2006; Unnever et al., 2006).  The current data source includes two measures of the 
respondents’ view of the Bible, the first of which assessed whether or not the respondent 
considers the Bible to be divinely inspired; I use this first version in the religious beliefs scale.  A 
second version of the question explicitly asks if the respondent believes that the Bible is “true, to 
be taken word for word,” “true, but not to be taken word for word,” or “true for religion, but with 
                                                 
4
 The evolution item is included in the religious belief scale under the assumption that the alternative belief is 
creationism (see Smidt et al., forthcoming).  
5
 The factor analysis generated a single item with an Eigenvalue of 2.339 with factor loadings of 0.555 (existence of 
God), 0.609 (view of God), 0.521 (afterlife), 0.732 (view of Bible), 0.670 (devil), and 0.636 (evolution).  The α for 
the scale is 0.806. 
6
 The factor analysis generated a single item with an Eigenvalue of 2.894 with factor loadings of 0.820 (church 
attendance), 0.816 (Bible reading), 0.669 (prayer), 0.756 (small group participation), and 0.733 (tithing).  The α for 
the scale is 0.875. 
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some human errors.”  I constructed a dummy variable to identify Biblical literalists, those 
individuals who chose the first response option, in order to provide a direct comparison to past 
studies in this line of inquiry. 
 Finally, scholars argue that many of the current debates about theology and social issues 
that are being deliberated within denominations reflect an underlying question in regard to the 
role of the church in the modern world (Smidt et al., forthcoming).  Some people argue that 
religious traditions should adapt their beliefs to be more compatible with modern culture, while 
other people argue that religious traditions should adhere to traditional beliefs and resist 
modernism.  Smidt and his colleagues (forthcoming) posit that individuals’ opinions about this 
traditionalist-modernist divide may explain within-denomination variability of beliefs and 
attitudes toward social and political issues.  In order to test for such an effect, I create a dummy 
variable to identify traditionalists who responded to three questions that their church should 
“strive to preserve its traditional beliefs and practices” or replied that they are aware of a 
traditionalist-modernist divide within their congregation and support the traditional point of 
view. 
Control Variables 
 First, I control for the respondent’s political ideology because past research demonstrates 
that a conservative ideology is usually positively related to support for the death penalty and 
other punitive punishments (Payne, Gainey, Triplett, & Danner, 2004; Sandys & McGarrell, 
1997; Unnever & Cullen, 2005; Unnever et al., 2005b).  The variable is a scale that ranges from 
“very liberal” through “strict moderate” to “very conservative;” higher values indicate a more 
conservative ideology. 
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 Second, I address the fact that several studies find that various measures of prejudice 
against black individuals are related to support for punitive punishment policies (Soss et al., 
2003; Unnever & Cullen, 2007a, 2007b; Unnever, Cullen, & Fisher, 2005).  Thus, I control for 
antipathy against minorities using respondents’ level of agreement with the statement, 
“minorities need governmental assistance to obtain their rightful place in America;” high values 
indicate stronger opposition to government assistance for minorities.  This measure is admittedly 
shallow and does not even specify about which minorities it inquires.  Though a more robust 
measure of racist attitudes would be preferable, this is the only applicable measure contained 
within the data set.  Unnever and his colleagues (2006) utilized a similar measure that assessed 
the degree to which respondents agreed that the government should help blacks, and even this 
proxy measure for racism proved to be highly significant in their analysis.  Thus, I include the 
current measure as the best available proxy noting the theoretical need for such a control. 
 Finally, I control for six demographic characteristics.  First, I control for the respondent’s 
gender (male=1, female=0) because research indicates that males are more likely to support 
punitive crime control policies than women (Applegate et al., 2000).  Second, I include a 
dichotomous variables for black individuals (black=1, all others=0) because extant studies 
suggest that blacks are less likely to support punitive punishments than whites (Young, 1992).  
Some data suggest that age (Evans & Adams, 2003) and level of education (Payne et al., 2004; 
Soss et al., 2003) are negatively related to punitive beliefs.  Due to Borg’s (1997) demonstration 
of the conditional effects of southern identity on support for the death penalty, I include a 
dichotomous variable to identify respondents who are southerners.  Finally, I control for the 
respondent’s family income based upon findings consistent with conflict theory that individuals 
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with higher income will be supportive of punishment as a means of controlling so-called 
dangerous groups (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; Soss et al., 2003). 
Analytic Strategy 
 To analyze the effects of the independent variables on preference for life without parole 
over the death penalty, I employ ordered logit maximum likelihood estimation.  I use ordered 
logit instead of ordinary least squares regression because the ordinal, categorical nature of the 
dependent variable violates the underlying assumptions of OLS linear regression (Long, 1997).  
The model sample size differs from the total survey sample size due to missing observations 
within specific questions from the original data set.  I ran all models using Stata version 9. 
As mentioned above, I collapsed the response categories of the dependent variable from a 
5-point scale to a 3-point scale in an effort to overcome violations of the parallel regressions 
assumption.  The Roman Catholic, religious beliefs, political ideology, age, and gender variables 
all failed Brant’s Wald test at p < 0.05, which indicates that the effects of these variables differ 
between categories of the dependent variable (Long, 1997).7 One possible way to overcome this 
problem is to use multinomial logit instead of ordered logit because multinomial logit tests the 
likelihood of choosing between each pair of response categories.  However, the “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree” nature of the dependent variable response scale is truly ordinal.  
There is no theoretical reason to believe that a variable will exert a different effect on a 
respondent’s likelihood of responding “agree” vs. “no opinion” than on her likelihood of 
responding “strongly disagree” vs. “disagree,” for example.  Thus, it is probable that many 
variables violate the parallel regressions assumption because of random measurement noise 
between “strongly agree” and “agree” and between “strongly disagree” and “disagree.”  The 
                                                 
7
 Stata cannot calculate a Brant test on weighted data, so I had to run the Brant test on the same model using the 
unweighted data.  However, there is no reason to believe that weighting the data would correct the violations of the 
parallel regressions assumption detected by the Brant test. 
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conceptual difference between strong and “normal” agreement and disagreement may be less 
clear to an average citizen than it is to a scholar, particularly in regard to an issue that most 
people probably do not think about on a regular basis. 
 Collapsing the response categories between which I suspected random noise improved 
the fit of the ordered logit regression to the data.  Only two variables failed the Brant test using 
the 3-point dependent variable, Roman Catholic and age.  I am unconcerned with age because it 
is merely a control variable.  The fact that the Roman Catholic variable continues to violate the 
parallel regression assumption is more meaningful.  I reconsider the effects of Catholic 
denominational affiliation later in this paper. 
Results 
 Table 1 reports the results of the ordered logit regression on the 3-point dependent 
variable.  The results suggest that Roman Catholic affiliation, more active engagement in 
religious behaviors, and being African American increase the likelihood that an individual will 
support replacing the death penalty with life without parole.  In contrast, interpreting the Bible 
literally, opposing government aid to minorities, having higher family income, and being male 
decrease the likelihood of favoring LWOP over the death penalty. 
Interpreting the odds ratios, the data suggests that a standard deviation increase on a 
person’s score on the religious behavior index (i.e., more frequent church attendance, prayer, 
etc.) increases the odds that she will choose a) “agree/strongly agree” over “no opinion” or 
“disagree/strongly disagree” or b) “agree/strongly agree” or “no opinion” over “disagree/strongly 
disagree” by about 18%.  Blacks are about 46% more likely to choose a more agreeable response 
than members of other races.  On the other hand, both individuals who interpret the Bible  
literally and men are about 25% less likely to choose a more agreeable response than  
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Table 1: Results of Ordered Logit Analysis of Support for LWOP vs. the Death Penalty 
 
Variables Coefficients Robust Std. Error Odds Ratios 
Evangelical 0.055 0.159  
Mainline Protestant 0.247 0.181  
Black Protestant 0.532 0.350  
Roman Catholic 0.437* 0.174 a 
Religious Beliefs - 0.029 0.140  
Religious Behaviors 0.166 † 0.087 1.181 
Biblical Literalist - 0.292* 0.131 0.747 
Traditionalist - 0.061 0.164  
Antipathy Toward Minorities - 0.315*** 0.056 0.730 
Political Ideology 0.044 0.034  
Age 0.001 0.003  
Education - 0.091 0.056  
Income - 0.102** 0.030 0.903 
Black 0.375* 0.188 1.456 
Male - 0.299** 0.112 0.742 
Southerner 0.099 0.115  
 
Cut point 1 
 
- 1.527 
 
0.390 
 
Cut point 2 - 0.873 0.387  
Log likelihood - 1667.842   
Sample size 1794   
Notes: † p < 0.10,  * p < 0.05,  ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001, a = cannot be meaningfully interpreted 
non-literalists or women.  Finally, individuals become about 25% less likely to choose a more 
agreeable response the more strongly they disagree with the government giving aid to minorities, 
while increasing family income makes them about 10% less likely to agree. 
 The odds ratio of the Roman Catholic variable cannot be meaningfully interpreted 
because the variable continues to violate the parallel regressions assumption (Long, 1997).  That 
is, Roman Catholic affiliation does not appear to increase the odds of choosing “no opinion” over 
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“disagree/strongly disagree” by the same likelihood as the odds of choosing “agree/strongly 
agree” over “no opinion.”  Additional analysis is needed to understand this differential effect. 
Exploring Roman Catholic Opinions 
 The fact that Catholic affiliation seems to exert different effects between different 
response categories of the dependent variable suggests that the Catholic variable is concealing a 
wider range of causal forces.  In other words, it is possible that the effects of Catholic affiliation 
on one’s preference for LWOP over the death penalty may be dependent upon interaction with 
other factors.  For example, Bjarnason and Welch (2004) found that black Catholics and 
Catholics who attend mass more frequently were less supportive of capital punishment than 
white Catholics and infrequent attendees, while Republican Catholics were more likely to favor 
the death penalty than Democratic Catholics.  These results are consistent with theory and past 
results.  Whites, Republicans, and individuals who attend worship services infrequently or not at 
all tend to be more supportive of the death penalty than other Americans (Payne et al., 2004; 
Sandys & McGarrell, 1997; Unnever & Cullen, 2007a; Young, 1992).  Given that the U.S. 
Conference of Catholic Bishops has officially condemned the death penalty (USCCB, 2005), 
white, Republican, and “lapsed” Catholics face a degree of cognitive dissonance in which their 
personal characteristics might push them to favor the death penalty while their faith tells them to 
reject it.  Thus, the effects of Catholic affiliation may differ by race, political ideology, or level 
of engagement in religious practices. 
 In order to test this possibility, I re-ran my model and added multiplicative interaction 
terms between these three variables and Catholic affiliation.  Table 2 reports the results of this 
new analysis.  For the sake of space, I only report variables from the initial analysis that are 
statistically significant at p < 0.05, although all variables are controlled in the model.  The results  
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Table 2: Results of Ordered Logit Analysis of Support for LWOP vs. the Death Penalty 
with Catholic Interactions 
 
Variables Coefficient Robust Std. Error 
Biblical Literalist - 0.288* 0.131 
Antipathy Toward Minorities - 0.313*** 0.056 
Income - 0.094** 0.031 
Male - 0.323** 0.113 
Catholic X Political Ideology 0.184* 0.081 
Catholic X Religious Behavior 0.862*** 0.225 
Catholic X Black 0.357 0.865 
 
Cut point 1 
 
- 1.675 
 
0.404 
Cut point 2 - 1.011 0.401 
Log likelihood - 1651.772  
Sample size 1794  
Notes: † p < 0.10,  * p < 0.05,  ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001; All variables from Table 1 also controlled for in this 
analysis, but only those significant at p < 0.05 shown in Table 2. 
 
reveal that the interactions between Catholic affiliation and political ideology and religious 
behavior are statistically significant.  The interaction between Catholic affiliation and black race  
is not statistically significant, but this result is likely due to the fact that only 13 respondents in 
the data set are African American Catholics. 
 Several scholars warn that interpreting interaction terms as marginal effects yields 
incorrect conclusions (Ai & Norton, 2003; Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006).  Thus, in order to 
interpret the statistically significant interactive effects, I employ the method suggested by Long 
and Freese (2006, p. 423-425) in which I calculated the predicted probability of agreeing or 
disagreeing that the death penalty should be replaced by life without parole at each level of the 
constitutive variables.  For ease of presentation, I present these results graphically. 
 Figure 1 presents the effect of the interaction between Catholic affiliation and levels of 
religious behavior on the likelihood of disagreeing that the death penalty should be replace by  
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Figure 1: Predicted Probability of Disagreeing that the Death Penalty should be 
Replaced with LWOP
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Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Agreeing that the Death Penalty should be 
Replaced with LWOP
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LWOP, while Figure 2 presents the effect of the same interaction on the likelihood of agreeing 
with the replacement of the death penalty.  The figures indicate that an increasing level of 
engagement in religious behaviors appears to have no significant effect for non-Catholics; 
regardless of their level of engagement in religious behaviors, non-Catholics are always about 
55% likely to choose “disagree” or “strongly disagree” and about 30% likely to choose “agree” 
or strongly disagree,” holding all other variables at the mean.  In contrast, level of engagement in 
religious behaviors appears to have a roughly linear negative relationship with the likelihood of 
choosing “disagree/strongly disagree” and a roughly linear positive relationship with the 
likelihood of choosing “agree/strongly agree” for Catholics.  Catholics who do not frequently 
engage in religious behaviors, like attending church or praying privately, are about 81% likely to 
disagree and about 11% likely to agree that LWOP should replace the death penalty.  In contrast, 
Catholics who frequently engage in religious behaviors are about 40% likely to disagree and 
about 35% likely to agree with replacing the death penalty.   
Furthermore, the increase in the magnitude of the slope in each graph indicates that the 
effect of engaging in religious behaviors on the likelihood of agreeing or disagreeing that LWOP 
should replace the death penalty increases as one’s level of religious activity increases.  That is, 
the effect of religious behavior differs across response categories of the dependent variable.  
Indeed, this differential interactive effect may partially explain why the Roman Catholic dummy 
variable continued to violate the parallel regressions assumption in the ordered logit analysis. 
Figure 3 presents the effect of the interaction between Catholic affiliation and political 
ideology on the likelihood of disagreeing that the death penalty should be replaced by LWOP, 
while Figure 4 presents the likelihood of agreeing with the replacement of the death penalty.  On 
the whole, the interactive effect between Catholic affiliation and political ideology is very similar 
 26 
Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Disagreeing that the Death Penalty should be 
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Figure 4: Predicted Probability of Agreeing that the Death Penalty should be 
Replaced with LWOP
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to the effect of the interaction between Catholic affiliation and level of religious behavior.  
Again, political ideology exerts no statistically significant effect on non-Catholics’ likelihood of 
agreeing or disagreeing that LWOP should replace the death penalty.  On the other hand, 
increasing political conservatism decreases the likelihood that a Catholic will disagree and 
increases the likelihood that she will agree with the replacement of the death penalty by LWOP.  
Specifically, Catholics who identify as “very liberal” are about 66% likely to choose 
“disagree/strongly disagree” and about 21% likely to choose “agree/strongly agree,” while “very 
conservative” Catholics are about 38% likely to choose “disagree/strongly disagree” and about 
45% likely to choose “agree/strongly agree.”  This finding seems to indicate that politically 
liberal Catholics favor the death penalty more than politically conservative Catholics, a result 
that is very theoretically unexpected.  I posit different interpretations of this finding in the 
discussion. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 In this study, I contribute to the literature on religiosity and attitudes toward criminal 
punishment in two primary ways.  First, I employ the “3 Bs” measurement strategy created by 
Kellstedt, Smidt, and Guth (Kellstedt et al., 1996; Smidt et al., forthcoming), which has been 
validated to be a stronger predictor of religious and political behaviors than Smith’s (1990) 
fundamentalist/moderate/liberal denomination typology (Alwin, Felson, Walker, & Tufis, 2006; 
Steensland et al., 2000).  Second, the Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics allows me 
to test the effects of religious belonging, beliefs, and behaviors on citizens’ support for replacing 
the death penalty with a sentence of life without parole, a more nuanced question that has been 
shown to generate very different levels of support for the death penalty than simple “support-
oppose” measures (Bohm, 1991; Bohm et al., 1990; Bowers, 1993; McGarrell & Sandys, 1996; 
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Sandys & McGarrell, 1995).  To date, no other scholar has yet tested the influence of religiosity 
on support for the death penalty versus an alternate punishment.  Thus, my findings complement 
and challenge past findings based upon dichotomous measures of death penalty support. 
 In regard to the Christian religious independent variables, I find limited support for my 
hypothesis.  First, I find that individuals who interpret the Bible literally are less likely to agree 
that the death penalty should be replaced with LWOP than non-literalists.  This finding is 
consistent with past results that indicate a positive relationship between Biblical literalism and 
support for punitive punishments (Grasmick et al., 1992; Grasmick et al., 1993; Unnever et al., 
2005b; Young, 1992; Young & Thompson, 1995).  Second, I find that individuals who engage 
more frequently in religious behaviors like church attendance and private prayer are more likely 
to agree that LWOP should replace the death penalty.  This finding is also consistent with past 
results that find negative relationships between frequency of church attendance or other scales of 
religious behaviors and support for punitive punishments (Bader & Johnson, 2007; Unnever & 
Cullen, 2007a; Unnever et al., 2005a, 2005b).  However, I note that the religious behavior scale 
is only marginally significant, so it is unclear whether or not this finding is robust. 
 In contrast, affiliation with evangelical, mainline, or black Protestant denominations; the 
religious beliefs scale; and the traditionalism measure all fail to achieve statistical significance.  
These results suggest that the past studies that found no significant effect of fundamentalist 
denominational affiliation according to Smith’s (1990) code on attitudes toward punishment may 
be accurate (Applegate et al., 2000; Baumer et al., 2003; Sandys & McGarrell, 1997; Soss et al., 
2003; Unnever & Cullen, 2006); that is, denominational affiliation may not significantly affect 
individuals’ opinions about punishment when the affiliation variable and statistical models are 
properly specified.  However, it is also equally plausible to argue that denominational affiliation 
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does not influence an individual’s preferences on the specific policy-related question of choosing 
between the death penalty or LWOP.  Contrasting these results with the results of Bader and 
Johnson (2007) provide support for the latter interpretation because Bader and Johnson found 
that black and mainline Protestants are significantly less likely than evangelicals to support the 
death penalty.  In order to adequately resolve this puzzle, we need a data source that asks both 
global and nuanced death penalty support questions in addition to a full battery of religious belief 
and behavior items. 
 The effects of Roman Catholic affiliation on support for replacing the death penalty with 
LWOP are partially consistent with and partially contrary to the results of Bjarnason and Welch 
(2004).  To reiterate, Bjarnason and Welch find that Catholics who attend mass more frequently 
were less supportive of capital punishment than infrequent attendees, while Republican Catholics 
were more likely to favor the death penalty than Democratic Catholics.  I find that both higher 
levels of engagement in religious behaviors and an increasingly conservative political ideology 
make Catholics more likely to agree that the death penalty should be replaced with LWOP.  The 
former finding is consistent with theory and past research; the latter result is not.  Should we 
interpret these results to mean that politically liberal Catholics are more supportive of the death 
penalty than politically conservative Catholics?  Perhaps.  However, I think that we need to 
consider the full nuance of the dependent measure.   
Although a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole is certainly a more 
lenient punishment than the death penalty, it is still a very punitive punishment.  When liberal 
Catholics say that they disagree that the death penalty should be replaced with LWOP, perhaps 
they are saying that they oppose both punitive punishments.  That is, perhaps they would prefer 
to abolish the death penalty and replace it with a shorter prison term.  The logic behind this 
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interpretation is that the influence of a Catholic worldview “liberalizes” the attitudes toward 
punishment among all Catholics.  Perhaps, then, we see conservative Catholics preferring LWOP 
to the death penalty because their faith tells them to oppose capital punishment but their political 
beliefs lead them to desire strict, punitive punishment for criminals.  Without additional 
information, I have no way to resolve this puzzle.  My results reaffirm findings of very 
heterogeneous attitudes toward the death penalty amongst Catholic Americans, and I conclude 
that further research is needed to clarify the exact nature of the relationship between Catholic 
affiliation and attitudes toward capital punishment. 
 Finally, I find strong support for the argument that racism affects support for the death 
penalty.  Even though my measure is very vague, asking only about support for the government 
giving aid to minorities in general, this proxy for racism is the most statistically significant 
variable in my entire model.  Though its substantive effect of decreasing the likelihood that an 
individual will agree that the death penalty should be replaced by LWOP is comparable to the 
other variables with negative relationships, the proxy’s much greater statistical significant 
suggests that antipathy toward minorities matters a great deal shaping attitudes toward 
punishment.  This result supports similar findings in past studies (Soss et al., 2003; Unnever & 
Cullen, 2007a, 2007b; Unnever et al., 2005, 2006). 
Limitations 
 The selection of questions in the Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics limited 
the variables that I could include in this study. First, several scholars find that the effects of 
religious beliefs on attitudes toward punishment are mediated by an individual’s view of human 
nature and attribution of blame (Evans & Adams, 2003; Grasmick & McGill, 1994; Young, 
2000); that is, do individuals believe that the choice to commit a crime is driven by the social 
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environment in which the criminal was raised or by pure free will?  Evidence indicates that 
individuals who hold a dispositional attribution of blame are more supportive of punitive 
punishments than individuals who emphasize the role of the environment in the genesis of crime.  
Second, several scholars find that the degree to which a person endorses the values of 
forgiveness and compassion affects their support for punitive punishments (Applegate et al., 
2000; Unnever & Cullen, 2006; Unnever et al., 2005a).  As with attribution of blame, these 
variables partially mediate the effects of religiosity on attitudes toward punishment.  No items in 
the current data set measure these constructs, and so I have no way to test whether or not 
including these variables would affect my results.  I hypothesize that their inclusion would 
further dilute the magnitude of the religious variables’ coefficients. 
Conclusion 
 This study reaffirms the need to employ nuanced measures of opinion about the death 
penalty that allow respondents to qualify their support or opposition to capital punishment, 
especially in contrast to an alternative punishment.  While my results indicate that few 
dimensions of a person’s religiosity affect her preference for LWOP over the death penalty, more 
research using robust measures (Kellstedt et al., 1996; Smidt et al., forthcoming; Steensland et 
al., 2000) of religion is needed to determine whether or not past findings of a relationship 
between fundamentalist affiliation and attitudes toward punishment are methodological artifacts 
of Smith’s (1990) coding scheme. 
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Appendix 
A. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables 
Variable Exp. Sign N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Death Penalty vs. LWOP N/A 3946 2.739 1.284 1 5 
Evangelical - 4000 0.2515 0.434 0 1 
Mainline Protestant + 4000 0.175 0.380 0 1 
Black Protestant + 4000 0.022 0.146 0 1 
Roman Catholic + 4000 0.191 0.393 0 1 
Belief Scale - 3360 - 9.80e-09 0.885 - 2.872 1.283 
Behavior Scale + 3799 - 4.23e-09 0.930 - 1.624 1.631 
Biblical Literalist - 2284 0.575 0.494 0 1 
Traditionalist - 4000 0.010 0.298 0 1 
Minority Antipathy - 3935 3.09 1.138 1 5 
Political Ideology - 3658 4.34 1.900 1 7 
Age - 3981 50.267 17.678 18 99 
Education + 3992 4.078 1.212 1 6 
Income - 3705 6.475 2.199 1 9 
Black + 3953 0.108 0.310 0 1 
Male - 4000 0.46 0.498 0 1 
Southerner - 4000 0.321 0.467 0 1 
 
B. Protestant Denomination Responses Grouped by Religious Tradition 
Evangelical Protestant 
Adventist Christian 
Adventist (no further specifics) 
American Baptist Association 
Amish 
Anglican Orthodox Church 
Apostolic (no further specifics) 
Assemblies of God 
Associate Reformed Presbyterian 
Baptist (no further specifics)* 
Baptist General Conference 
Baptist Missionary Association 
Brethren (no further specifics)* 
Bible Holiness 
“Born Again,” Bible, Gospel, Missionary 
Charismatic (no further specifics)* 
Christian Church 
Christian and Missionary Alliance 
Christian Reformed Church 
Churches of Christ 
Church of Christ (no further specifics)* 
Church of God – Anderson, IN 
Church of God – Cleveland, TN 
Church of God, General Conference 
Church of God, Holiness 
Church of God – Huntsville, AL 
Church of God of the Apostolic Faith 
Church of God of Prophecy 
Church of God (no further specifics) 
Church of the Nazarene 
Congregational Christian 
Congregational (no further specifics)* 
Conservative Baptist Association of  
    America 
Conservative Congregational Christian 
Cumberland Presbyterian Church 
Episcopal, Anglican (no further specifics)* 
Evangelical Church of North America 
Evangelical Congregational Church 
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Evangelical Covenant Church 
Evangelical Free Church – Free Church 
Evangelical Friends Alliance 
Evangelical Lutheran (not ELCA) 
Evangelical Presbyterian Church 
Evangelical (no further specifics)* 
Four Square Gospel 
Free Lutheran 
Free Methodist Church 
Free Will Baptist 
Fundamentalist (no further specifics) 
General Association of Regular Baptists 
General Conference Mennonite Church 
Grace Brethren Church 
Holiness (no further specifics) 
Independent Baptist (local, non-affiliated) 
Independent Fundamentalist Churches of   
     America 
Interdenominational or Community Church* 
“Just Christian” (no further specifics)* 
Liberal or Ecumenical Protestant* 
Lutheran Brethren 
Lutheran (no further specifics)* 
Mennonite Church 
Mennonite (no further specifics) 
Methodist (no further specifics)* 
Missouri Synod Lutheran 
Moravian Church 
Nondenominational-Independent  
    Charismatic 
Nondenominational-Independent Christian* 
Nondenominational-Independent  
    Evangelical 
Nondenominational-Independent  
    Fundamentalist 
Nondenominational-Independent Protestant* 
Nondenominational-Independent (no further  
    specifics)* 
North American Baptist Conference 
Open Bible Standard 
Orthodox Presbyterian 
Other Adventist 
Other Baptists* 
Other Bible, Gospel, Born Again, or 
Missionary Church 
Other Charismatic 
Other Christian* 
Other Church of Christ 
Other Church of God 
Other Congregational* 
Other Evangelical 
Other Fundamentalist 
Other Holiness 
Other Lutheran* 
Other Mennonite, Amish 
Other Methodist* 
Other Pentecostal 
Other Presbyterian* 
Other Protestant* 
Other Reformed* 
Other Nondenominational-Independent* 
Pentecostal Church of God 
Pentecostal Holiness Church 
Pentecostal (no further specifics)* 
Presbyterian Church in America 
Protestant (no further specifics)* 
Primitive Baptist 
Reformed Episcopal Church 
Reformed Presbyterian Churches of North  
    America 
Reformed (no further specifics)* 
Salvation Army, American Rescue Workers 
Seventh Day Adventist 
Southern Baptist Convention 
The Brethren Church 
The Vineyard, Calvary Chapel, Church on 
the Rock 
United Baptists 
Wesleyan Church 
Wesleyan Methodist 
Wisconsin Synod Lutheran 
Worldwide Church of God 
 
Mainline Protestant 
 
American Baptist Churches USA (“Northern  
    Baptist”) 
Baptist (no further specifics)** 
Brethren in Christ 
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Brethren (no further specifics)** 
Charismatic (no further specifics)** 
Church of the Brethren 
Church of Christ (no further specifics)** 
Congregationalist Congregational 
Congregational (no further specifics)** 
Disciples of Christ (Christian Church) 
Episcopal Church 
Episcopal, Anglican (no further specifics)** 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America  
    (ELCA) 
Evangelical Lutheran Synod 
Evangelical (no further specifics)** 
Interdenominational or Community  
    Church** 
“Just Christian” (no further specifics)** 
Liberal or Ecumenical Protestant** 
Lutheran (no further specifics)** 
Methodist (no further specifics)** 
Nondenominational-Independent  
    Christian** 
Nondenominational-Independent  
    Protestant** 
Nondenominational-Independent (no further  
    specifics)** 
Other Baptists** 
Other Brethren 
Other Christian** 
Other Congregational** 
Other Episcopal, Anglican 
Other Friends 
Other Lutheran** 
Other Methodist** 
Other Presbyterian** 
Other Protestant** 
Other Reformed** 
Other Nondenominational-Independent** 
Pentecostal (no further specifics)** 
Plymouth Brethren 
Presbyterian Church in the USA 
Presbyterian (no further specifics) 
Protestant (no further specifics)** 
Quaker, Friends (no further specifics) 
Reformed Church in America 
Reformed (no further specifics)** 
Society of Friends 
United Church of Christ 
United Methodist Church 
 
Black Protestant 
 
African Methodist Episcopal 
African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church 
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church 
Church of God in Christ 
National Baptist Convention 
Progressive National Baptist Conference 
 
* = categorized as evangelical if respondent also replied that “belief in Jesus Christ is the only 
way to salvation” to question 91 and replied that the Bible is “true, to be taken word for word” to 
question 93 
** = categorized as mainline if respondent also replied that “belief in Jesus Christ is ONE way to 
salvation, but there are other ways as well” to question 91 
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